NONACQUIESCENCE BY THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE
COMMISSION: ITS RELEVANCE TO THE
NONACQUIESCENCE DEBATE
PETERJ. ROONEYt
INTRODUCTION

The twentieth century has witnessed the creation in the United
States of large and powerful federal administrative agencies that
perform both adjudicative and interpretive functions under the
control and direction of the Executive. The growth of these
agencies has lead to a corresponding increase in conflicts between
judicial and administrative interpretations of federal law. These
conflicts have resulted in numerous, and at times bitter, clashes
between the judiciary and the various agencies. One tactic taken by
the agencies, as part of their effort to restrict the power of federal
courts to shape federal law, and thereby restrict or direct administrative activities, is to refuse to follow precedents set by various
circuit courts of appeals. This action is referred to as nonacquiescence.
Administrative agency nonacquiescence is defined in its broadest
sense as "an administrative agency's refusal to follow judicial
precedent when the agency handles Cases that involve similar
issues."' Nonacquiescence is divided into two categories: intercircuit or intracircuit. Intercircuit nonacquiescence is the refusal of
an agency to follow the ruling of a circuit court of appeals in cases
arising in a different circuit. This type of nonacquiescence is a
generally accepted and noncontroversial form of agency behavior
that is typically pursued for the purpose of producing circuit
conflicts and eventual Supreme Court review.
This Comment is concerned primarily with intracircuit nonacquiescence, the refusal of an agency to follow the precedent of a
circuit court of appeals in subsequent cases arising in the same
circuit. Intracircuit nonacquiescence is a very controversial practice,
which has spurred a sharp debate in recent years. 2 Nonacquiest B.A. 1989, Amherst College;J.D. Candidate, 1992, University of Pennsylvania.
The author wishes to thank Professor A. Leo Levin under whose guidance this
Comment was drafted and Professor Alan Steinberg who introduced me to the field
of securities law.
1 Deborah Maranville, Nonacquescence: Outlaw Agencies, Imperial Courts and the
Perils Of Pluralisr, 39 VAND. L. REV. 471, 475 (1986) (footnote omitted).
2 See Matthew Diller & Nancy Morawetz, Intracircuit Nonacquiescence and the
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cence is classified as either formal or informal. Formal nonacquiescence is exemplified by "an explicit public statement that the agency
intends to disregard a particular judicial decision."3 Informal
nonacquiescence is exemplified by agency disregard of judicial
precedents or attempts to identify factual distinctions while giving
the appearance of compliance with precedent. 4 This Comment will
demonstrate that formal and informal nonacquiescence is practiced
by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC or Commission)
and will explore its implications for the nonacquiescence debate.
As Professor Deborah Maranville noted in her leading article on
the subject, agency nonacquiescence is not a new phenomenon and
has been practiced regularly by the Internal Revenue Service (IRS)
5
and the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) for decades.
Prior to the 1980s, these two agencies were the focus of most if not
all of the attention directed at the issue of nonacquiescence. 6 In
recent years, however, the controversial nonacquiescence policy of
the Social Security Administration (SSA) has come to dominate the
7
debate.
This Comment seeks to expand the boundaries of the study of
nonacquiescence by focusing on the SEC, an agency commonly
ignored in nonacquiescence scholarship.
As the controversy
surrounding intracircuit nonacquiescence continues, it is important

Breakdown of the Rule of Law: A Response to Estreicher and Revesz, 99 YALE L.J. 801
(1990); Samuel Estreicher & Richard L. Revesz, The Uneasy Case Against Intracircuit
Nonacquiescence: A Reply, 99 YALE L.J. 831 (1990) [hereinafter Estreicher & Revesz,
The Uneasy Case]; Samuel Estreicher & Richard L. Revesz, Nonacquiescence by Federal
Administrative Agencies, 98 YALE L.J. 679 (1989) [hereinafter Estreicher & Revesz,
Nonacquiescence]; Austin J. Murphy, When the Government Ignores the Law, JUDGE'SJ.,
Summer 1990, at 2.
3 Maranville, supra note 1, at 476-77.
4 See id. at 480.
5 See id. at 473.
6 See Lynn P. Mattson, The United States Circuit Courts and the NLRB: 'StareDecisis'
Only Applies if the Agency Wins, 53 OLA. B.J. 2561 (1982); Gary L. Rodgers, The
Commissioner "DoesNot Acquiesce," 59 NEB. L. REv. 1001 (1980); Don A. Zimmerman

& David Dunn, Relations Between the NLRB and the Courts of Appeals: A Tale of
Acrimony andAccommodation, 8 EMP. REL. L.J. 4 (1982); Comment, The Commissioner's
Nonacquiescence, 40 S. CAL. L. REv. 550 (1967); Edward F. Zwick, Comment, Treasury

Department'sPracticeofNon-acquiescence to Court Decisions, 28 ALB. L. REv. 274 (1964).
7 See Gerald W. Heaney, Why the High Rate of Reversals in Social Security Disability
Cases?, 7 HAMLINE L. REv. 1 (1984); James R. Williams, The Social Security Administration's Policy of Nonacquiescence, 12 N. KY. L. REV. 253 (1985); Ann Ruben, Note, Social
Security Administration in Crisis: Nonacquiescenceand Social Insecurity, 52 BROOK. L.
REV. 89 (1986), Christopher C. Taintor, Note, FederalAgency Nonacquiescence: Defining
and Enforcing ConstitutionalLimitations on Bad Faith Agency Adjudication, 38 ME. L.
REv. 185 (1986).
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that any discussion of policy include the effects of nonacquiescence
on a variety of governmental agencies. The following analysis shows
that SEC nonacquiescence diverges markedly from the behavior of
the three agencies traditionally studied. The Comment concludes
that generalizations concerning nonacquiescence by all federal
agencies are unjustified. The approaches and prescriptions of
recent scholarship based on such generalizations concerning
nonacquiescence are therefore flawed.
I. CURRENT APPROACHES TO NONACQUIESCENCE
A. The Social Security Administration'sNonacquiescence Campaign
The current debate surrounding agency intracircuit nonacquiescence is profoundly influenced by memories of the SSA's stubborn
nonacquiescence during the 1980s. The SSA revoked the social
security disability benefits of hundreds of thousands of individuals
through the use of a judicially-rejected interpretation of the Social
Security Act and the standard of proof it imposes upon individuals
attempting to retain their benefits. 8 The history of SSA policy
illustrates why intracircuit nonacquiescence is so controversial.
In 1980, Congress authorized a program of continuing disability
investigations (CDIs) to combat cheating by recipients. 9 When the
Reagan administration came to office, the SSA vigorously conducted
CDI investigations, resulting in the termination of benefits of almost
500,000 people. 10 The SSA placed the burden of proof upon
disability beneficiaries, who had to show in review hearings that they
were still disabled to avoid termination of their benefits.11 The
SSA continued this policy despite repeated rulings by various
federal courts of appeals that the Social Security Act required the
agency to show that the recipient's medical condition had improved
before terminating benefits. 12 Vast numbers of SSA orders
8 See Ruben, supra note 7, at 91.

9 See id. at 95.
10 See id. at 89.
" See id. at 99-100.

12 See De Leon v. Secretary of Health and Human Servs., 734 F.2d 930 (2d Cir.
1984); Buckley v. Heckler, 739 F.2d 1047 (5th Cir. 1984); Harmon v. Secretary of
Health and Human Servs., 749 F.2d 357 (6th Cir. 1984); Rush v. Secretary of Health
and Human Servs., 738 F.2d 909 (8th Cir. 1984); Byron v. Heckler, 742 F.2d 1232
(10th Cir. 1984); Dotson v. Schweiker, 719 F.2d 80 (4th Cir. 1983); Kuzmin v.
Schweiker, 714 F.2d 1233 (3d Cir. 1983); Patti v. Schweiker, 669 F.2d 582 (9th Cir.
1982); Simpson v. Schweiker, 691 F.2d 966 (1lth Cir. 1982); Cassiday v. Schweiker,
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denying benefits were never appealed by the mostly poor, physically
and mentally ill, uneducated, and uncounseled beneficiaries, despite
the high likelihood that their appeals would have been successful. 13 Most of these individuals lacked the resources to pursue
litigation. Even if they had sufficient resources, relief would have
been years away, due to the sudden flood of social security claims
14
upon already crowded court dockets.
To avoid adverse Supreme Court precedents, the SSA did not
seek certiorari in the cases in which it was defeated. Thus, vigorous
and defiant nonacquiescence enabled the SSA to maintain its policy
of denying claims even in the face of repeated court defeats. The
SSA nonacquiescence policy provoked bitter criticism from all
quarters: Congress, the press, state governments,1 5 and the bench.
One judge compared SSA nonacquiescence with the "repudiated
16
pre-Civil War doctrine of nullification."
In the end, extreme judicial measures were brought to bear
against the SSA nonacquiescence policy. In the case of Lopez v.
Heckler,17 a class action was filed joining all Ninth Circuit SSA
claimants. The class of plaintiffs sought to enjoin continued SSA
nonacquiescence to Ninth Circuit precedent as a denial of due
18
process and a violation of the separation of powers doctrine.
The district court issued a preliminary injunction forbidding the
SSA from ignoring Ninth Circuit precedent. 19 Although the Ninth
Circuit affirmed the preliminary injunction, the Supreme Court
eventually vacated it because of congressional amendments to the
20
Social Security Act.
663 F.2d 745 (7th Cir. 1981).
13 See Ruben, supranote 7, at 101 n.57 (noting that close to half of the people who
had their benefits terminated successfully appealed (citing 130 CONG. REc. S11,464
(daily ed. Sept. 19, 1984) (statement of Sen. Heinz))).
14 See id. at 90 n.4 (stating that 50,000 SSA appeals were pending in federal court
at one time (citing 130 CONG. REc. S11,460 (daily ed. Sept. 19, 1984) (statement of
Sen. Sasser))).
15 See id. at 100-01 nn.56-57.
16 Lopez v. Heckler, 713 F.2d 1432, 1441 (9th Cir. 1983) (Pregerson, J.,
concurring).
17 572 F. Supp. 26 (C.D. Cal.), stay den., 713 F.2d 1432 (9th Cir.), stay granted,463
U.S. 1328 (1983), vacated, 469 U.S. 1082 (1984).
18 See id. at 28.

19 See id. at 30.

20 See Heckler v. Lopez, 469 U.S. 1082 (1984); see also Estreicher & Revesz,
Nonacquiescence,supra note 2, at 701.
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In Stieberger v. Heckler21 , and Schisler v. Heckler22 a district
court and a circuit court panel, both within the Second Circuit,
enjoined the SSA from continuing to nonacquiesce in that Circuit.
The district court in Stieberger held that SSA nonacquiescence "was
inconsistent with the constitutionally required separation of
powers."28 The injunction in Schisler merely required the SSA to
publish in its relevant publications its acquiescence to the Second
Circuit ruling for the purpose of informing its employees that they
were required to follow this decision. 24 The court limited injunctive relief to this publication order.
The judicial measures taken by the Ninth and Second Circuits,
combined with public outrage and congressional action, 25 finally
curbed the SSA nonacquiescence. The present debate takes place
in the shadow of SSA nonacquiescence and the hardship it imposed
upon hundreds of thousands of impoverished Americans who lacked
the resources to vindicate their legal rights.26 This Comment
seeks to expand the debate over nonacquiescence by exploring its
implications upon other agencies whose purposes and tactics may
be much different than the SSA's.
B. The CurrentDebate
In her article, Professor Maranville provides a general description of the various forms of nonacquiescence. Maranville identifies
four doctrines by which courts and commentators have sought to
limit agency nonacquiescence: stare decisis, issue preclusion or
27
collateral estoppel, due process, and separation of powers.
Criticizing each doctrinal approach, Maranville finds that none
provides a satisfactory rationale for limiting or barring agency
She
nonacquiescence, whether intercircuit or intracircuit. 28
21 615 F. Supp. 1315 (S.D.N.Y. 1985), vacated sub nom. Stieberger v. Bowen, 801
F.2d 29 (2d Cir. 1986).
2 787 F.2d 76 (2d Cir. 1986).
23 Stieberger, 615 F. Supp. at 1367.
24 See Schisler, 787 F.2d at 84.
25 See Social Security Disability Benefits Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-460,
98 Stat. 1794 (1984) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 423(f) (1988)) (codifying the requirement
that the administration prove medical improvement before revoking benefits).

26 Cf Note, Collateral Estoppel and Nonacquiescence: Precluding Government
Relitigation in Pursuit of Litigant Equality, 99 HARv. L. REV. 847 (1986) (stating that
agencies have obtained a procedural advantage by being able to pursue a strategy of
nonacquiescence).
27 See Maranville, supra note 1, at 499.
28 See id. at 499-527.
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concludes that because a doctrinal resolution is not possible, a
determination of the proper limits of agency nonacquiescence
depends upon a prior value judgement:
The question whether nonacquiescence is legitimate or desirable
can be resolved at a theoretical level only by reference to a prior
choice between conflicting values. The decisionmaker must
choose between the perspective of the agency and that of the
courts, between rule of law values and bureaucratic values....
[I]t is unlikely
[V]alue conflict pervades administrative law ....
to be resolved generally or permanently in the context of nonac29
quiescence.
Other commentators take issue with Maranville's skepticism
about the existence of a principled basis for defining the legitimate
extent of agency nonacquiescence. In their recent article, Nonacquiescence by Federal Administrative Agencies,3 0 Samuel Estreicher and
Richard L. Revesz expressly reject Maranville's conclusion, stating
that "rather than an open-ended choice between conflicting values,
the proper treatment of nonacquiescence flows, we believe, from an
understanding of the respective functions of agencies and courts in
our administrative lawmaking system." 3 1 Focusing on the SSA and
NLRB, the authors describe nonacquiescence in essentially the same
terms as Maranville. After presenting their rejection of constitutional challenges to nonacquiescence, 3 2 Estreicher and Revesz then
present an analysis of the costs and benefits of nonacquiescence.
They conclude that intercircuit nonacquiescence and nonacquiescence in cases in which the agency does not know which circuit will
be reviewing its decision3 3 are essential to the proper functioning
of the agencies and judiciary, and therefore should not be limited.
This conclusion is not controversial.
Turning to the more controversial issue of intracircuit agency
nonacquiescence, Estreicher and Revesz adopt a strong stance in
favor of allowing agencies to nonacquiesce under given circumstances. They conclude that intracircuit nonacquiescence is justified and
should be allowed "when it is employed as an interim measure that
allows the agency to maintain a uniform administration of its

29 Id. at 528-29.
30 Estreicher & Revesz, Nonacquiescence,supra note 2.
31 Id. at 682 n.14.
32 See id. at 718-35.

13 These cases are referred to as "nonacquiescence in the face of venue choice."
Id. at 683.
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governing statute while it makes reasonable attempts to persuade
the courts to validate its preferred policy."3 4 To give substance to
this standard, Estreicher and Revesz propose that agency nonacquiescence be allowed if a three part test can be satisfied. The test
requires (1) "that the agency have national policymaking authority
over the point in dispute,"3 5 (2) that the agency have "a justifiable
basis' for [the] belief that the agency's position falls within its
policymaking discretion,"36 and (3) "that the agency be reasonably
seeking to vindicate its position in the courts of appeals and before
the Supreme Court." 7 Estreicher and Revesz believe that if this
test is satisfied agency intracircuit nonacquiescence is justified.
They propose that justified agency nonacquiescence be protected
from the types of judicial remedies employed against the SSA in
40
Lopez v Heckler,38 Stiebergerv. Heckler, 9 and related litigation.
As justification for their proposal, Estreicher and Revesz offer
an analysis of the costs and benefits associated with intracircuit
nonacquiescence. They argue that intracircuit nonacquiescence is
beneficial because it allows a circuit court to benefit from and
participate in ongoing intercircuit dialogue by reconsidering its
previous disposition of an issue. 4 1 Estreicher and Revesz also
argue that intracircuit nonacquiescence helps agencies avoid the
42
need for different administration of the law in different circuits,
and thus advances the goal of achieving uniform outcomes in
enforcement proceedings 43 brought by agencies throughout the
country.4 4 According to Estreicher and Revesz, the primary costs of
intracircuit nonacquiescence are the undesirable distributional
effects, as poor plaintiffs are unable to vindicate their rights due to
lack of resources for litigation. 45 The authors also note that
34 Id. at 753.
35 Id. at 754.
36 Id.

37 Id. at 755.
38 572 F. Supp. 26 (C.D. Cal.), stay den., 713 F.2d 1432 (9th Cir.), stay granted,463
U.S. 1328 (1983), vacated, 469 U.S. 1082 (1984).

3' 615 F. Supp. 1315 (S.D.N.Y. 1985), vacated sub nom. Stieberger v. Bowen, 801
F.2d 29 (2d Cir. 1986).
40 See supra notes 12 & 17-24 and accompanying text.
41 See Estreicher & Revesz, Nonacquiescence, supra note 2, at 743-47.
42 See id. at 748-49.
13 These same arguments also apply to the goal of equal benefit distribution in
different circuits.
44 See Estreicher & Revesz, Nonacquiescence,supra note 2, at 747.
45 See id. at 749-50.
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46
relitigation leads to an increased workload for federal courts.
The position taken by Estreicher and Revesz has been sharply
criticized. Matthew Diller and Nancy Morawetz, two veterans of the
SSA nonacquiescence litigation, 4 7 reject the Estreicher and Revesz
analysis as grossly understating the costs and greatly overstating the
benefits of intracircuit nonacquiescence. 48 Diller and Morawetz
claim that intracircuit nonacquiescence makes little or no contribution to intercircuit dialogue because "circuit court rules [are]
designed to achieve stability of precedent," 49 and "these rules
require panels to follow prior panels within their circuits." 50 As
a result, they conclude that most intercircuit dialogue results from
conflicting decisions in different circuits, not from the same circuit.
Diller and Morawetz also dispute Estreicher and Revesz's claim that
intracircuit nonacquiescence increases uniformity of treatment of
claimants and uniformity of administration. 51 Diller and Morawetz
point out that intracircuit nonacquiescence actually exacerbates
these two problems by creating disuniformity between the way
wealthy and poor litigants are treated.5 2 The crux of Diller and
Morawetz's critique is that Estreicher and Revesz ignore the
devastating consequences that intracircuit nonacquiescence has
upon individual claimants or litigants who are denied the benefits
53
of judicial standards.
Diller and Morawetz also attack the proposals of Estreicher and
Revesz on the grounds that they (1) disregard the importance of
circuit court precedent in establishing a coherent body of laws in
the United States, 54 (2) baselessly advance the notion that agencies
are entitled to deference in their decisions not to acquiesce based
on congressional authorization of the agency as an interpreter of its
basic statute, 55 and (3) ignore the threat intracircuit nonacquiescence poses to due process, equal protection, and separation of
powers. 56 The relevance of the Diller and Morawetz analysis of
nonacquiescence to incidents of SEC nonacquiescence will be called

46 See id. at 750.
17 See Diller & Morawetz, supra note 2, at 801 n.tt.
48 See id. at 812.
49 Id. at 812.
50 Id. at 805.
51 See id. at 814-15.

See
55 See
54 See
55 See
56 See
52

id. at
id.
id. at
id. at
id. at

815.
804-05.
818-21.
821-25.
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into question by the following discussion.
II. OVERVIEW OF THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION

The SEC was created by Congress through the Securities
Exchange Act of 193457 (1934 Act) to provide federal regulation
of the securities industry. The need for regulation of the industry
arose in response to widespread abusive and fraudulent practices in
the selling of securities to the public and the trading of securities,
both of which contributed to the 1929 stock market crash. 58
The SEC is empowered to enforce a variety of statutes that
govern the securities industry and the capital markets. 59 The most
significant sections of the securities laws are its anti-fraud provisions, such as section 10-b of the 1934 Act and related provisions in
other statutes. 60 The securities laws mandate full disclosure of all
material facts regarding the sale of securities, whether to the public
or in private transactions, and they make fraud in selling or trading
of securities a predicate for civil and criminal liability under federal
61
law.
The SEC attempts to prevent securities fraud by requiring
registration of all publicly sold securities and their issuers, 62 and
by imposing continuing disclosure obligations. 63 Broker-dealers,
securities exchanges, investment companies, and investment
The SEC also
advisors must register with the Commission.
57 Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-291, 48 Stat. 881 (1934)
(codified
as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-7811 (1988)).
58
See THOMAS L. HAZEN, THE LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION 7 (2d student ed.
1990).
59 The most significant of these statutes are: the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C.
§ 77 (1988) (regulating the distribution of domestic and foreign securities); the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78 (1988) (regulating all aspects of
public trading of securities and also establishing the SEC); the Investment Company
Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-1 to -64 (1988) (regulating investment companies,
including their fiduciary duties, fees, and registration and disclosure requirements);
and the Investment Advisers Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-1 to -21 (1988) (regulating
non-broker-dealers who render investment advice).
'0 One such anti-fraud provision is § 17 of the Securities Act of 1933, which
proscribes the use of any instrumentality of interstate commerce to engage in
fraudulent sales or offerings. See 15 U.S.C. § 7 7 q (1988).
61 See Securities Exchange Act of 1934, §§ 18, 32, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78r, 78ff (1988).
62 See Securities Act of 1933, § 5, 15 U.S.C. § 77e (1988).
63 See Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 13, 15 U.S.C. § 78m (1988).
6 See id. §§ 5, 6, 15, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78e, 78f, 78o; Investment Company Act of 1940,
§ 8, 15 U.S.C. 80a-8 (1988); Investment Advisers Act of 1940, § 203, 15 U.S.C. § 80b3 (1988).

1120

UNIVERSITY OFPENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 140:1111

promulgates and enforces prohibitions on abusive and fraudulent
tactics in the marketplace, such as insider trading. Augmenting the
SEC's regulatory framework are the self-regulating organizations
(SROs). These organizations, which write their own rules, include

the various stock exchanges, such as the New York Stock Exchange
(NYSE), and the institutions that facilitate trading over the counter,
such as the National Association of Securities Dealers (NASD). 65
The SEC retains the right to suspend or revoke an SRO's registra66
tion if the SRO fails to comply with the 1934 Act.
To enforce the securities laws the Commission is empowered to
hold enforcement hearings, or administrative trials, to determine if
violations have occurred. Upon finding a violation, the Commission
is empowered to impose sanctions on the individual, partnership, or
corporation charged. Since all broker-dealers, investment advisors,
and investment companies are required to register with the

Commission to do business lawfully, the Commission commonly
sanctions violations by revoking or suspending these registrations.
SEC final orders are directly reviewable by the circuit courts of
appeals.

Other enforcement powers of the SEC include the right to
refuse to register securities, 67 which prevents their sale, and the
right to issue stop-orders, which require the cessation of sales
already taking place. 68 If a security is already issued and being

traded, the Commission has the power to suspend trading in that
69
security for up to ten days.

The Commission also has the right to investigate possible
violations. Formal SEC investigations, which must be publicly
announced, can only be undertaken with the express approval of the
Commission. 70 Once the SEC staff receives an order to investigate, it is further authorized to issue subpoenas to compel testimony
and the production of documents. Although there is no financial
or procedural penalty should a subpoena recipient refuse to com65 The rules governing these two institutions are found in 2 NEW YORK STOCK
EXCHANGE GUIDE (CCH) (1984) and NASD SECURITIES DEALERS MANUAL (CCH)

(1990). Other SROs include the Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board and the
Chicago Board Options Exchange (CBOE).
66 See Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 19(d)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 78s(h)(1) (1988).
67 See Securities Act of 1933, § 8(b), 15 U.S.C. § 77h(b) (1988).
68 See id. § 8(d), 15 U.S.C. § 77h(d).
69 See Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 12(k), 15 U.S.C. § 781(k) (1988).
70 See RICHARD W.JENNINGS & HAROLD MARSHJR., SECURITIEs REGULATION 1526-

27 (6th ed. 1987).
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ply,7 1 the subpoena can be enforced through court order.7 2
Perhaps the most potentially damaging weapon in the SEC
arsenal is its right to bring lawsuits in federal court seeking
injunctions against possible violations. The issuance of an injunction against an individual or corporation can provide grounds for
the Commission to permanently bar such individual or organization
from the securities industry.73 In the context of tender offers and
proxy solicitations, the issuance of a preliminary injunction can
block an enjoined party's transaction. 74 Under section 21(a) of the
Exchange Act, the Commission is authorized to publish, at its
discretion, the findings of its investigations in releases. 75 These
findings may include an implicit threat of enforcement action.
Thus, even without formal disciplinary sanctions, the SEC can
express its disapproval of certain activities.

III. FORmAL PUBLIC SEC NONACQUIESCENCE: THE UNUSUAL CASES
A search of SEC releases since 1944 uncovers only two instances
of publicly announced or published statements by the SEC in which
it flatly stated that it would refuse to comply with a recent court
ruling because it regarded that ruling as wrongly decided. The
rarity of this practice illustrates how the conductof the SEC differs
from that of the IRS or SSA, both of which routinely proclaim that
they will disregard judicial decisions. 76 Judging from the lack of
commentary concerning the SEC in this area, most writers have
apparently interpreted the reticence of the Commission as proof
that it does not regularly engage in nonacquiescence.
The striking aspect of these two formal public statements of
nonacquiescence is that neither one of the contested court decisions
directly overruled a Commission order or attempted to change
7' Noncompliance

with an SEC investigation is hardly a recommended course of

action. Jennings and Marsh note that "[s]uch contumacy is rarely advisable, since it

will infuriate the SEC staff, and they are likely to make life as unpleasant as possible
to the person involved during the subsequent course of the proceeding." Id. at 1527.
72

See Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 21(c), 15 U.S.C. § 78u(c) (1988).

73 In SEC v. Milken, Litig. Release No. 12454, [1989-90 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec.

L. Rep. (CCH) 95,200 (Apr. 24, 1990), the SEC used a prior court injunction as a
basis for permanently barring the defendant from the securities industry.
74 See Louis Loss, FUNDAMENTALS OF SEcURITIES REGULATION 491-97, 531-32
(1988).
75
76

See Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 21(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78u (1988).
See Maranville, supranote 1, at 477-78 & nn.14-17 (discussing nonacquiescence

by the IRS, SSA, NLRB, and Tax Court).
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internal SEC practices. Courts have done just that in other cases,
and have drawn much more measured responses from the Commission. Both rulings at issue did constitute a thieat to the SEC,
however. They threatened to curtail sharply the SEC's efforts to
regulate important sectors of the financial markets. In the first
instance, Grayson-Robinson Stores, Inc. v. SEC, 77 SEC influence over
bankruptcy reorganizations was threatened. Similarly, in Greenfield
v. Heublein, Inc.,78 SEC-mandated standards for disclosure of
pending corporate control transactions were seriously challenged.
A. The Commission Does Not Acquiesce:
Grayson-Robinson Stores, Inc. v. SEC
In the Grayson case, the Second Circuit rejected an attempt by
the SEC to force Grayson-Robinson, the debtor in possession in a
Chapter XI bankruptcy case, to refile under Chapter X.7 9 Under
Chapter X, an independent trustee would have been put in charge
of the corporation, whereas under Chapter XI the debtor corporation's management often stays in place.8 0 The SEC attempted to
81
force the case into Chapter X by motion in the district court,
and appealed when this motion was rejected. As the court of
appeals noted, Congress created this SEC right of action through
amendments to the Bankruptcy Code in 1952:
In 1952 Congress altered Chapter XI in two respects relevant here.
It added § 328, providing that "The judge may, upon application of
the Securities and Exchange Commission or any party in interest....

if he finds that the proceedings should have been brought under
chapter X of this Act, enter an order dismissing the proceedings
under this chapter," unless the debtor amends its petition to seek
Chapter X relief .... 82
77 320 F.2d 940 (2d Cir. 1963).
78 742 F.2d 751 (3d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1215 (1985).
79 Grayson, 320 F.2d at 941-42.
8
0 This case was litigated under the Bankruptcy Act of 1898 as amended. See
Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 541, 30 Stat. 544 (1898) (as amended) (repealed 1978).
Very different procedures are now in force pursuant to the Bankruptcy Act of 1978.
See Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (1978)
(codified as amended in 11 U.S.C.). In this particular case the original Grayson
management was still in place during the bankruptcy. See Grayson, 320 F.2d at 94446.
81 See In re Grayson-Robinson Stores, 215 F. Supp. 921, 922 (S.D.N.Y), afd, 320
F.2d 940 (2d Cir. 1963).
82 Grayson, 320 F.2d at 947.
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The court stated that the congressional intent behind this amendment to the Bankruptcy Code was to establish a means by which the
SEC could intervene in bankruptcies involving widely disbursed
security holders to ensure that public and private interests were
adequately protected 83. This greater protection of security holders
was achieved in Chapter X through the appointment of a disinterested trustee to run the corporation and through SEC oversight of
84
the reorganization.
The court of appeals upheld the district court's order denying
the Commission's motion to cause the bankruptcy to be refiled in
Chapter X. The Second Circuit held that the districtjudge properly
balanced various factors allowing for the conclusion that a Chapter
X refiling was unnecessary to protect the investing public. Writing
for the court of appeals, Judge Friendly stated:
This is a case where no publicly held securities are being readjusted, the creditors have had vigorous independent representation,
stockholder interests have offered substantial contributions, and
rights to pursue claims for dereliction remain unaffected. In such
circumstances a court can hardly ignore a substantially uncontradicted factual showing that Chapter XI affords some hope of
paying off creditors whereas Chapter X offers none.85
The court of appeals emphasized that the district court properly
considered the financial burden upon the debtor and its creditors
in exercising its discretion not to grant the motion. Discussing the
delicate balancing involved, the court of appeals noted that
"[h]owever we might decide the case if the record contained no
more than this, we do not feel warranted in upsetting the judge's
exercise of discretion when there is added to the scales the evidence
as to the drastic financial consequences of transfer to Chapter
x."

86

The circuit court's decision was controversial for two reasons.
First, the decision appeared to accord great weight to the financial
interests of the debtor and its creditors in determining whether a
83 See id. at 948 (citing SEC v. United States Realty & Improvement Co., 310 U.S.

434, 456 (1940)).
' See Bankruptcy Act of 1898, Chapter X, § 156 (as amended June 23, 1938)

(repealed 1978) (providing for the appointment ofan independent trustee); id. § 172
(providing for SEC review of reorganization plans and issuance by SEC of advisory
report).
85 Grayson, 320 F.2d at 950.
86 Id. at 949.
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case should be placed under Chapter X and whether a disinterested
trustee should be appointed. Second, the decision invested the trial
judge with broad discretion in making that determination.
In a strongly worded dissent from the denial of a rehearing en
banc, Judge Charles E. Clark argued that the Grayson decision
conflicted with Supreme Court precedent and would severely
hamper SEC efforts to fulfill its enforcement mandate. Clark
argued that the standards set out in previous Supreme Court cases
required that Grayson be reorganized under Chapter X.
[W]e have here all the criteria emphasized by the Supreme
Court[8 7 ] ... as requiring reorganization under SEC supervision
in Chapter X proceedings, rather than an unsupervised arrangement under Chapter XI. The debtor's commercial empire is
indeed expansive, including... [a] nationwide chain of... shops
....
[T]he debtor... was the largest retail seller of photographic
and audio equipment and supplies in the United States. Grayson's
common stock is listed on the New York Stock Exchange and is
held by approximately 3,470 investors.... Thus the public nature
of the debtor would seem beyond debate.
Furthermore, the possibility that new management is sorely
needed is suggested from the fact that until ...

present manage-

ment gained control of Grayson, the debtor had enjoyed many
consecutive years of profitable operation....
The "Plan of Arrangement" ... would appear to require SEC
expertise for its proper evaluation ....
[I]ndependent appraisal of

whether Grayson got the better end of the bargain would seem
88
imperative.
Judge Clark outlined five factors weighing in favor of requiring
a Chapter X filing: (1) the large size of the debtor enterprise, (2)
the presence of public security holders, (3) the questionable
capability of present management, (4) the sophisticated nature of
the plan of arrangement, and (5) the questionable fairness of the
plan. He then derided the interests weighing against granting the
SEC motion for a Chapter X petition, namely the desires of the
debtor and creditors to avoid the financial risks of a Chapter X
trusteeship:
The only countervailing reasons for excluding the government
87 judge Clark was here referring to the leading Supreme Court precedents of
General Stores Corp. v. Shlensky, 350 U.S. 462 (1956), and SEC v. United States
Realty & Improvement Co., 310 U.S. 434 (1940).
88 Grayson, 320 F.2d at 950-51 (Clark, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en
banc).
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agency charged with representing the public from considering a
situation so requiring its study is that the creditors for the most
part seem to be approving and that there is a need for haste lest
the business be disrupted. These would seem rarely controlling to
furnish overriding objections to a case which the SEC...
believes
89
should be the subject of further agency supervision.
Judge Clark concluded by stating that the Court's decision would
have severe adverse effects upon SEC enforcement capabilities:
The decision itself,.., which appears to be contrary to decisions
of this court and of the Supreme Court ...

puts in jeopardy

practically all attempts by the SEC to execute its statutory
responsibility to investigate and supervise the reorganization of
large corporations in this circuit, since the denial of such power in
a case with the complexity of corporate relations here shown
presages a potential battle in practically all such cases in the
90
future.
The SEC responded quite rapidly to the adverse decision by
asking the Solicitor General of the United States to seek certiorari
to the United States Supreme Court. The Solicitor General refused
to do so. On October 22, 1963 the Commission released its
extraordinary "Statement of Nonacquiescence," 91 which recounted
its efforts to obtain certiorari and stated its hostility to the Second
Circuit ruling:
The Commission has been advised by the Solicitor General
that he has decided not to file a petition with the United States
Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari to review ... GraysonRobinson Stores v. S.E.C..... The Solicitor General does not
believe that the case presents a proper question for consideration
by the Supreme Court at this time.
The decision not to seek Supreme Court review in this case,
however, should not be construed as acquiescence by the Commission in the decision of the Court of Appeals or concurrence with
92
the views expressed in the opinion.
After the release, the SEC embarked upon a course of litigation,
both inside and outside of the Second Circuit, in which it attempted
89

Id. at 952.

90 Id. at 950.
91 Statement of Nonacquiescence by Securities and Exchange Commission in

Grayson-Robinson Stores, Inc. v. Securities and Exchange Commission, 320 F.2d 940,
SEC Corporate Reorganization Act Release No. 208, 1963 SEC LEXIS 1165 (October
22, 1963).
92 Id.
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to reassert its authority to force Chapter XI bankruptcies to refile
under Chapter X. This relitigation involved not only intercircuit,
but also, and more significantly, intracircuit nonacquiescence.
The Second Circuit based its decision in Grayson upon a
balancing test which accorded great weight to the financial interests
of the debtors and creditors involved in the petition. In a subsequent SEC attempt to obtain conversion from Chapter XI to
Chapter X, SEC v. Canandaigua Enterprises Corp.,93 the Second
Circuit altered the balancing test. In Canandaigua,Judge Friendly,
the author of the Grayson opinion, wrote a decision ordering that an
SEC motion for conversion of a Chapter XI bankruptcy to Chapter
X be granted. The SEC motion was granted despite the overwhelming opposition of the creditors and debtors involved and credible
claims that a Chapter X filing could destroy the business. 94 The
court spoke of its displeasure "at having to insist on a course which
scarcely a creditor or stockholder has sought and which may lead to
disaster." 95 Judge Friendly distinguished this case from Grayson on
the basis that Canandaigua's reorganization involved adjustment of
publicly held debt, while Grayson-Robinson's reorganization
involved adjustment of only trade debt.
Public investors are far more likely than trade creditors to be illinformed ... and they lack the trade creditors' opportunity for
advantage from profitable dealings with a management well
disposed to them.... The case of trade or other private creditors
with whom we dealt in Grayson-Robinson is radically different.9 6
Although Judge Friendly maintained that the Canandaiguacase
was "radically different" from Grayson, there are some striking
similarities between them: (1) both reorganizations involved the
issuance of debt securities which were exempt from SEC registration; 97 (2) in the opinion of the respective courts, both managements required investigation; 98 (3) both reorganizations were of

93 339 F.2d 14 (2d Cir. 1964).
94 Canandaigua Enterprises's sole operation was a horse racing track in upstate
New York. See id. at 15. The court noted the judgment of the district court that
there was "grave danger that the entire venture will bejeopardized if the matter is
changed to a Chapter X proceeding." Id. at 17.
95 Id. at 21.
96 Id. at 20.
97 See Canandaigua,339 F.2d at 20 (stating that the debt securities were exempt
from registration under § 264 and § 393 of the Bankruptcy Act); Grayson, 320 F.2d
at 948 (stating that the general debentures, though eligible for trade, were exempt
from registration under § 393(a)(2) of the Bankruptcy Act).
98 See Canandaigua,339 F.2d at 18; Grayson, 320 F.2d at 948.
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questionable fairness;9 9 and most importantly, (4) in both cases,
Chapter X held great financial risks for the creditors and debtors
involved. Despite these similarities, Judge Friendly made the
adjustment of publicly held debt in Canandaigua the overriding
factor in the decision. Judge Friendly went so far as to argue that
the readjustment of publicly held debt in a corporate bankruptcy
creates a presumption that a Chapter X filing is required: "[W]e do
not read [General Stores Corp. v. Shlensky] as precluding a court of
appeals from ruling that the need for a readjustment of publicly
held debt creates a presumption in favor of Chapter X .... ""0
While this opinion does not directly overrule Grayson,1" 1 the
Canandaiguadecision represents an important departure from the
multi-factored balancing test mandated by Grayson, which accorded
great deference to debtor and creditor interests.
The SEC program of relitigating the issue ruled upon by the
Second Circuit in Grayson was obviously more acceptable to the
courts than the SSA relitigation of the 1980s. The SEC did not and
could not openly flout and ignore circuit court precedent (since
enforcement action consisted of motions in district court). Because
it did not raise the ire of judges or litigants, the intracircuit
nonacquiescence practiced in Canandaiguamay seem insignificant.
Nevertheless, SEC relitigation in the Second Circuitresulted in a
substantial alteration of the test to be applied by judges deciding
wliether to grant SEC motions for a Chapter X refiling.
The SEC also challenged the Grayson decision in other circuits.
In SEC v. Crumpton Builders, Inc.,10 2 a Fifth Circuit case, the SEC
pressed aggressively for the adoption of what the court called "an
ironclad rule that transfer must be required when some of the
unsecured debt is held by the investing public in the form of
debentures rather than in the form of trade debt."10 3 The Fifth
Circuit panel refused to create such a rule, but it did hold that the
district court had overstepped its discretion in denying the SEC
99 See Canandaigua, 339 F.2d at 21; Grayson, 320 F.2d at 948-49 & n.13.
100 Canandaigua,339 F.2d at 19.

101 The Supreme Court recognized the conflicting nature of Grayson and
Canandaiguain SEC v. American Trailer Rentals Co., 379 U.S. 594 (1963). Justice
Goldberg cited Canandaiguain support of the holding that public debt readjustment
requires Chapter X filing, and he cited Grayson as a contrary authority. See id. at 613
n.12.
102 337 F.2d 907 (5th Cir. 1964).

103 Id. at 911.
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motion.1 0 4 In his opinion in Canandaigua,Judge Friendly compared and contrasted "the more flexible criteria suggested in Judge
Wisdom's thoughtful opinion in [Crumpton]"10 5 with the presumption he was creating for the Second Circuit.
The entire issue was finally reviewed by the Supreme Court in
SEC v. American Trailer Rentals Co.' 0 6 American Trailer presented
an especially compelling situation for Chapter X trusteeship. The
company was committing massive fraud on investors by selling
rights in trailers that were never constructed, while large amounts
of funds simply disappeared.
The company was forced into
bankruptcy because the SEC halted its illegal securities sales,
thereby cutting off the company's source of funds.10 7 The facts
heavily supported the SEC's position, and the circuit court decision,
which denied the Chapter X trusteeship,10 8 was a clear error.
The Supreme Court rejected the SEC's contentions "that, as an
absolute rule, all proceedings for the financial rehabilitation of a
corporate debtor which would alter the rights of public investor
creditors must be in Chapter X,"10 9 but it did adopt a balancing
test that would usually lead to this conclusion:
[There are only] narrow limits within which there are exceptions to this general rule that the rights of public investor creditors
are to be adjusted only under Chapter X. "Simple" compositions
are still to be effected under Chapter XI. Such a situation, even
where public debt is directly affected may exist, for example,
where the public investors are few in number and familiar with the
operations of the debtor, or where, although the public investors
are greater in number, the adjustment of their debt is relatively
minor .... 110
Commenting on the scope of discretion allowed the trial judge in
deciding whether a bankruptcy must be refiled under Chapter X,
Justice Goldberg cited the Canandaiguaholding as support for the
proposition that the trial judge cannot make the determination
111
simply based on what he thinks is best for the debtor.

See id. at 907-08.
Canandaigua,339 F.2d at 21 n.7 (citing Crumpton, 337 F.2d at 911).
106 379 U.S. 594 (1965).
107 See id. at 599.
108 See In re American Trailer Rentals Co., 325 F.2d 47 (10th Cir. 1963), rev'd, 379
U.S. 594 (1965).
109 American Trailer, 379 U.S. at 607.
10 Id. at 614.
m"See id. at 619-20 (citing Canandaigua,339 F.2d at 19, for the proposition that
'04

105
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The SEC's refusal to acquiesce to Grayson illustrates some of the
benefits that Estreicher and Revesz claim intracircuit nonacquiescence can have on intercircuit dialogue and the "percolation" of
issues in preparation for Supreme Court review.11 2 In Canandaigua, the SEC relitigation of'the issues preselted in Grayson
allowed the Second Circuit, and Judge Friendly himself, to revisit
the issues and consider them in light of other circuit court rulings,
especially the Fifth Circuit's decision in Crumpton. When the issues
were finally addressed by the Supreme Court in American Trailer,
the Court considered them with the benefit of Judge Friendly's
analysis in Canandaigua.
The relitigation engaged in by the SEC, however, does not
satisfy all three prongs of the test Estreicher and Revesz believe
should be met before allowing an agency to nonacquiesce. The first
prong of the test requires "that the agency have national policymaking authority over the point in dispute."11 3 In this case the
dispute between the court of appeals and the SEC was over the
proper interpretation of the Bankruptcy Code, not the securities
laws. According to Estreicher and Revesz, a necessary condition for
legitimate intracircuit nonacquiescence is that the dispute between
the agency and the courts concerns the interpretation of the
agency's organic statute.1 1 4 Yet, the SEC's nonacquiesence to
Grayson appears to be a paradigmatic example of nonacquiescence
that these theorists find beneficial. Grayson illustrates one of the
contradictions that emerge when the Estreicher and Revesz
approach is applied to agencies other than those for which it is
designed.
The concerns of Diller and Morawetz,1 1 5 that nonacquiescence
harms vulnerable individual plaintiffs, are irrelevant to this
particular episode of SEC nonacquiescence. The SEC enforcement
action here involved well-counseled corporations rather than
individuals, so no due process or equal protection problems were
evident. Since the Grayson nonacquiescence consisted of simple
relitigation, a challenge to the authority of the judiciary raised no
separation of powers concerns either. Despite the fact that SEC
excessive discretion would leave decisions to turn on the "particular experience and
predilections" of the judge).
112 See Estreicher & Revesz, Nonacquiescence, supra note 2, at 743-47.
113 Id. at 754.
114 See id.
115 See supra notes 47-56 and accompanying text.

1130

UNIVERSITY OFPENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 140:1111

nonacquiescence to Grayson did not threaten harm to individual

litigants, the primary evil of nonacquiescence according to Diller
and Morawetz, their approach, which is completely hostile to
1 16
intracircuit nonacquiescence, would require its prohibition.
B. SEC Nonacquiescence to Third CircuitEfforts to Narrow
CorporateDisclosure Obligations in Takeovers:

Greenfield v. Heublein, Inc.
The SEC has publicly rejected and planned to disregard only
one other circuit court decision-the Third Circuit's ruling in
Greenfield v. Heublein, Inc. 117 That case involved a class action
brought by a Heublein stockholder who sold his stock after
corporate officials issued a statement that they knew of no reason
why the trading volume of their stock had increased eight-fold in
one day. 118 In fact, the Heublein officials were engaged in private
preliminary merger negotiations with the RJ. Reynolds Company
and were aware that the surge in trading activity was probably
caused by individuals trading with knowledge of this potential
transaction.11 9 The plaintiff and other stockholders sold their
stock after this announcement for approximately $45.00 per
share. 120 Two weeks after its announcement, Heublein agreed to
12 1
merge with RJ. Reynolds at a price of $60.00 per share.
The plaintiffs brought suit on the grounds that Heublein's false
statements constituted an "untrue statement of a material fact"
made "in connection with the purchase or sale of any security" and
therefore violated section 10(b) 122 and Rule 10b-5 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.123 The plaintiffs also argued that
See Diller & Morawetz, supra note 2, at 808 ("If the decisions of the circuits
were not accorded precedential weight, but were constantly open to question, these
courts would be easily overwhelmed by parties raising issues addressed in earlier
rulings by the same court. The system simply could not function if precedent were
so unstable.")
117 742 F.2d 751 (3d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1215 (1985).
118 See id. at 754.
119 See id.
120 See id. at 754-55.
121 See id.
122 Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1988).
123 Rule lob-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1983). This rule provides:
116

It shall be unlawful for any person ...
(2) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state
a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light
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Heublein's failure to disclose the ongoing merger negotiations and
to correct its prior denial was an omission to state a material fact
necessary to prevent its prior statements from being "misleading."1 2 4 The plaintiffs sought damages for their lost trading
profits, but the district court gave summary judgment to the defend125
ants.
On appeal, the Third Circuit concluded that since the Heublein
management had not been aware of any leaks of their ongoing
merger talks, and since it was only through a leak that the merger
negotiations could have caused a surge in trading volume, Heublein
did not make a false statement when it said that it "was aware of no
reason that would explain the activity in its stock trading on the
NYSE." 126 The court found a lack of awareness notwithstanding
that Heublein trading volume surged from an average of 32,500
127
shares per day to 242,500 in one day during the negotiations.
Since, according to the appellate court, Heublein's statement was
not false, the district court's entry of summary judgment was
affirmed.
As for the second charge, the appellate court agreed that if the
existence of the preliminary negotiations had been a material fact,
Heublein, by virtue of its earlier statement, would have had a duty
to disclose them to make its earlier statement "not misleading."
The court held, however, that, as a matter of law, preliminary
merger negotiations do not become material until an "'agreement
in principle'" is reached.1 2 8 The court then defined "agreement
in principle" as agreement upon both price and structure of the
merger.129 Since Heublein and R.J. Reynolds did not agree on
these items until the night before the merger, after the name
plaintiff and almost all members of the plaintiff class had sold their
stock, none of the plaintiffs had a valid claim for their trading
1 0
losses.
of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading...
in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.

Id.

124 See Heublein, 742 F.2d at 755 & n.4.
125 See id. at 755.
126 Id. at 754.

127 See id. at 754 n.1. The price per share also rose $2.75 on that day.
128 Id. at 756 (quoting Staffin v. Greenberg, 672 F.2d 1196, 1207 (3d Cir. 1982)).
129 See id. at 756-57.

130 See id. at 757.
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Although not a party to this litigation, the SEC was clearly
displeased with the result. The SEC took the position that a
statement by an issuer to the effect that merger discussions are not
occurring when in fact they are constitutes a false and misleading
material statement and therefore a violation of section 10-b and
Rule lOb-5 of the Exchange Act. The SEC expressed its disapproval
of the Heublein decision through a so-called 21(a) letter. 3 1 The
Commission bluntly stated: "The Commission believes that Heublein
was wrongly decided." 13 2 The Commission then put corporate
management on notice that if they chose to measure their disclosure
responsibilities by the judicial standard and failed to adhere to the
standard announced by the SEC when engaged in merger negotiations, they could expect trouble:
Issuers that make public statements are required under Section
10(b) of the Exchange Act and Rule lOb-5 thereunder to speak
truthfully and to include all material facts necessary to make the
statements made, in light of the circumstances ...

not materially

misleading. This requirement applies to issuers engaged in preliminary
acquisitiondiscussions. The Commission will take appropriateenforcement
33
action against issuers which fail to comply with these requirements.1
The SEC decided that the standard of materiality for mergers would
34
be the same as for ordinary corporate developments.1
This example of SEC nonacquiescence presents a unique
problem in terms of judicial control over such behavior. The SEC
has not yet taken any enforcement action that the courts can
overturn. It has simply threatened that in the future it will take
enforcement action against issuers who fail to conform to the
Commission's disclosure requirement, as opposed to that of the
Third Circuit.
An issuer would incur huge risks if it were to challenge the
SEC's interpretation of the disclosure law. Even in the face of
1 Under § 21(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, the SEC has the power
to publish the results of its investigations. See 15 U.S.C. § 78u (1988). Ostensibly, the
SEC was publishing the results of its investigation into the Carnation-Nestle merger
when it released its statement of nonacquiescence to Heublein.
132 In re Carnation Co., Exchange Act Release No. 22,214, [1984-85 Transfer
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 83,801, at 87,596 n.8 (July 8, 1985).
133 Id. at 87,597 (emphasis added).
134 This standard was declared in SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833,
849 (1968) (stating that materiality "will depend at any given time upon a balancing
of both the indicated probability that the event will occur and the anticipated
magnitude of the event")
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eventual repudiation in court, many types of SEC enforcement
actions, ranging from investigation to the obtaining of a preliminary
injunction, could severely damage or even ruin a planned corporate
control transaction. The mere threat of being forced to defend a
suit by the SEC on charges of secuirities fraud can compel a party to
adhere to the SEC's interpretation.
The SEC release sparked considerable debate over the propriety
of such a statement,13 5 with the SEC vigorously defending its right
to state its position publicly.1 3 6 One commentator opined that
issuers were lucky that the SEC had bothered to state its position at
all before seeking to enforce it:
The § 21(a) report simply placed issuers on notice about the
Commission's interpretation of Heublein. The less satisfactory
alternative would be for the Commission to articulate its view
through the medium of an enforcement action, an alternative
particularly unpalatable to the subjects of the investigation. The
Carnation release at least provided advance warning, allowing
issuers to modify their actions in a way that will avoid conflict with
the Commission's interpretation and a possible enforcement
7
13

action.

Viewed from this perspective, there is little doubt that the publication of the Carnationrelease was intended as an enforcement act by
the Commission, designed to further its standard requiring
disclosure. The use of this method of nonacquiescence by the SEC
can probably be attributed to the effectiveness with which the threat
of SEC action tends to intimidate issuers and other entities
138
regulated by the Commission.
Since the issue presented in Heublein is one normally raised in
private suits for damages caused by alleged securities fraud, the SEC
135 See, e.g., Douglas M. Branson, SEC Nonacquiescence inJudicialDecisionmaking.

Target Company Disclosure of Acquisition Negotiations, 46 MD. L. REv. 1001 (1987)
(discussing the disclosure policy that should be implemented with regard to
acquisitions, not, as the title suggests, SEC nonacquiescence);J. Robert Brown, Jr.,
CorporateSecrecy, the FederalSecurities Laws, and the Disclosureof OngoingNegotiations,
36 CATH. U. L. REV. 93, 160-61 nn. 246-47 (1986) (listing and discussing various
commentary critical of the release); Uncertainty Over Merger Disclosure is Costly,
Grundfest Tells ABA Group, 18 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No. 15, at 521 (Apr. 11,
1986) [hereinafter Remarks of SEC Commissioner](pointing out different views relating
to the importance of the SEC release).
136 See Remarks of SEC Commissioner,supra note 135, at 521.
137 Brown, supra note 135, at 161 n.247.
138 See Monroe H. Freedman, A Civil LibertarianLooks at Securities Regulation, 35
OHIO ST. L.J. 280, 282 (1974) (arguing that the SEC "depends upon intimidation of
individuals, business firms, and attorneys though aggressive abuse of its power").
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did not have an opportunity to litigate it. The Commission did,
however, press its position in amici briefs. When the issue was
finally laid to rest in Basic Inc. v. Levinson,1 39 Heublein was overruled and the SEC's standard of materiality of merger negotiations
was adopted. 4 °
This type of SEC nonacquiescence to a court of appeals decision
is significant because it is free from judicial interference. The SEC's
decision to issue a statement of its opinion was not reviewable by
any court, yet that simple act may have effectively secured compliance with the SEC's interpretation of the law. Considering that the
SEC can easily bring suit against any issuer in almost any jurisdiction, an SEC threat is real. 14 1 Therefore, the SEC could effectively nullify Heublein and deny its benefits to issuers located and doing
business solely within the Third Circuit's jurisdiction.
The SEC's nonacquiescence to Heublein also raises the issue of
what notice, if any, litigants are entitled to when an agency decides
it will ignore circuit court precedent. It would appear that a littlepublicized agency decision to pursue enforcement proceedings
based upon a statutory interpretation rejected by the relevant
reviewing court deprives a defendant of necessary notice. Such lack
of notice could constitute a denial of due process.
Estreicher and Revesz would clearly approve of the type of
nonacquiescence practiced by the SEC in response to Heublein. The
dispute involved the "organic statute" of the SEC, which had a
reasonable argument for its interpretation, and which sought to
obtain review by the Supreme Court. Diller and Morawetz,
however, would likely oppose this SEC action on due process and
separation of powers grounds. The SEC threat to take enforcement
action against issuers, presumably even if eventual circuit court
review would overturn such action, is the type of behavior of which
Diller and Morawetz are critical. Such agency action threatens to
convert the administrative process from a good faith effort to
resolve the issues into a series of hurdles which a litigant must
overcome before obtaining judicial review. 142 Diller and Morawetz probably would find the SEC assertion that it, and not the
485 U.S. 224 (1988).
140 See id. at 236.
141 See Securities Exchange Act of'1934, § 27, 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (1988); HAZEN,
supra note 58, at 807-08.
142 See Diller & Morawetz, supra note 2, at 826 ("[T]he administrative process
becomes a series of obstacles yielding decisions that are predictably subject to reversal
by reviewing courts.").
139
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circuit court, is the proper interpreter of the relevant statutes to be
unacceptable and a violation of the separation of powers doc143
trine.
The concerns for individual rights, distributional fairness, and
separation of powers that motivafe the Diller and Morawetz critique
of nonacquiescence are, however, irrelevant in this instance. Hence,
the prohibitive approach to nonacquiescence advocated by them is
overinclusive. The Commission's nonacquiescence affected wellcounseled corporate litigants, not impoverished social security
recipients. Perhaps more importantly, the SEC's position was
adopted in rather short order by the Supreme Court. The SEC was
not trying to deadlock the courts. Rather, the SEC prevented the
adoption of a mistaken approach until its view was vindicated. It is
difficult, if not impossible, to identify any legitimate interests that
were damaged by this example of SEC nonacquiescence.
IV. THE SEC AS A COURT: THE STANDARD OF PROOF CONTROVERSY

The reaction of the SEC to Collins Securities Corp. v. SEC,144 a
decision of the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit that raised the
standard of proof required in Commission enforcement proceedings, presents an excellent example of the difficulties involved in
assessing the extent of SEC nonacquiescence, its utility, and the
effects of attempting to increase statutory or judicial checks upon
it. Collins reversed the imposition of SEC sanctions against a
broker-dealer and its individual proprietor for alleged stock
manipulation on the grounds that the Commission was required to
judge the charges against the broker by a standard of "clear and
convincing evidence," instead of the usual Commission standard of
"preponderance of the evidence." 145
The court's opinion began by noting that while preponderance
of the evidence is the traditional standard for administrative
proceedings, the Supreme Court had created exceptions to this rule
in cases where the sanction to be imposed is quite severe, such as
deportation. 146 Collins and his firm were accused of securities
fraud, and the sanctions imposed by the SEC were severe. The
company's registration was revoked, effectively putting it out of
143 See id. at 824-25.
144 562 F.2d 820 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
145 See id. at 826.
146 See id. at 823 (citing Woodby v. INS, 385 U.S. 276, 286 (1966)).
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business. In addition, Collins himself was barred from the securities
1 47
industry for a two-year period, depriving him of his profession.
The evidence against Collins and his firm was largely circumstantial, as it often is in fraud cases. 148 The court reasoned that
in cases such as this, involving difficult-to-prove charges and heavy
sanctions, a higher standard was necessary to protect defendants:
Two elements appear relevant to the standard we should impose
here: (1) the type [of] case (fraud); (2) the heavy sanction
(deprivation of livelihood). Given those elements, typical of many
S.E.C. cases, and given the type of circumstantial proof on which
the SEC must often rely, it appears to us that the "clear and
convincing evidence" standard is the proper standard here
149

Thus, although the charges that the SEC had filed against Collins
involved securities fraud rather than common law fraud, the court
decided that the "clear and convincing" standard was suitable in the
150
securities context.
Although the SEC did not publicly state its opposition to the
Collins ruling, the analysis below demonstrates that the SEC
nonacquiesced in Collins, both formally and informally.
The
informal aspect of the SEC resistance to Collins is what makes its
extent difficult to evaluate. 1 51 Collins required the Commission
to adopt a new higher standard of proof in determining, during its
enforcement hearings, whether or not persons before the Commission had committed violations of the anti-fraud provisions of the
152
securities laws and regulations that would warrant sanctions.
Decisions of the Commission are directly reviewable by the circuit
courts of appeals, including the Court of Appeals for the D.C.
Circuit, to which the litigant always has the option of appealing. 153 SEC venue provisions are extremely broad, creating great
uncertainty as to which circuit will exercise appellate review of an

147 See id. at 821.
148 See id. at 824.
149 Id.
150 See id. at 825-26.

151 See Maranville, supra note 1, at 480-81 ("[ljnformal nonacquiescence is more
difficult to identify than formal nonacquiescence. Only by exhaustively tracing the
history of individual cases can one identify instances of agency failure to follow
judicial precedent.").
152 These regulations include not only the rules promulgated by the Commission,
but also the rules promulgated by the Exchanges, NYSE, AMEX, and NASD, as well
as other SROs.
153 See Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 25, 15 U.S.C. § 7 8y (1988).
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SEC enforcement order. Thus, SEC nonacquiescence in such cases
cannot be neatly characterized as intracircuit or intercircuit.
A. SEC Enforcement Orders
An analysis of SEC releases ordering or declining to order
disciplinary action against broker-dealers and other persons during
the period when Collins was good law appears to indicate substantial
SEC compliance with the Collins ruling. In several disciplinary
opinions the Commission claimed that it had applied a clear and
convincing standard of proof in weighing the sufficiency of the
evidence. This claim was expressed by the SEC in a variety of ways,
however. In some opinions the Commission simply mentioned that
it had applied a clear and convincing evidence standard, as it did in
the Dirks case, for example: "Applying these general rules to the
facts at hand, we find the evidence clear and convincing, as did the
administrative law judge, that Dirks willfully disseminated material
facts ... ."154 In another case, the Commission apparently
applied the standard stringently in overturning an administrative
law judge's (ALJ) finding of liability, holding that, "on the basis of
our review of the record, we are unable to conclude that the fraud
allegations against Bertoli have been sustained by clear and
155
convincing evidence."
More commonly, Commission decisions stated that Collins might
not be applicable, but that the issue was not properly before them
since violations were found under the "clear and convincing"
standard. The SEC often used this language in orders reviewing the
disciplinary actions of the exchanges on appeal. The issue arose in
this context because the exchanges often continued to apply the
preponderance of the evidence standard in their disciplinary
actions. A typical example of this language is found in the Schloss
release:
Citing Collins Securities Corp. v. S.E.C., Schloss also contends that
the Exchange was required to dismiss the charges against him
unless they were supported by clear and convincing evidence.
However, although the NYSE rejected the Collins standard, it
stated that its conclusion would have been the same even if it had
applied that standard.... In any event we also find the evidence
56
against Schloss clear and convincing.1
154 In re Dirks, Exchange Act Release No. 17,480, 47 S.E.C. 434, 442 (1981).
155 In re Bertoli, Exchange Act Release No. 17,438,47 S.E.C. 430,432 n.6 (1981).

156 In re Schloss, Exchange Act Release No. 16,934,47 S.E.C. 317,323 n.24 (1980)
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In several other cases the Commission recited that it made its
findings based on the clear and convincing standard while expressing doubt as to its applicability: "whether or not we must apply the
higher standard of proof.., is of no consequence here. We have
again reviewed the record and we find the evidence ... clear and
convincing."117 Even where the Commission assumed the validity
of Collins but found that it was not applicable in that particular case,
the Commission still made its findings based on clear and convincing evidence:
[The defendant] also claims that the evidence against him must be
clear and convincing.... [T]he clear and convincing standard is
only applicable to cases of fraud. This appeal does not involve any
findings of fraud. Thus, Collins is clearly inapposite. In any event,
respect to [the defendant's] violations
we find the evidence15with
8
clear and convincing.
Although a quick overview of SEC disciplinary opinions seems
to indicate a broad SEC policy of acquiescing to the Collins decision
even where such deference is not legally required, a closer look at
the record shows that despite SEC claims of deference, the
Commission was informally nonacquiescing to Collins in these
disciplinary cases. That study first requires a discussion of formal
SEC nonaquiescence to Collins.
B. Formal SEC Nonacquiescence to Collins
The SEC's formal nonacquiescence to Collins is strong evidence
that the Commission was also nonacquiescing informally. In a select
number of cases, the Commission mounted facial challenges to the
Collins ruling. Unfortunately for a broker named Decker, his case
was chosen by the SEC to test the validity of Collins1 5 9
Decker was charged with willfully aiding and abetting a violation
of § 17(e)(1) of the Investment Company Act of 1940.160 Fraud
(emphasis added) (citations omitted).
157 In re Chatham, Exchange Act Release No. 14,594,46 S.E.C. 1181, 1182 (1978).
Similar language finding the applicable standard of proof to be an open question is
found in an SEC disciplinary opinion, In re DMR Securities, Inc., Exchange Act
Release No. 16,990, 47 S.E.C. 350, 353 n.15 (1980).
158 In re Seaton, Exchange Act Release No. 16,207, 47 S.E.C. 131, 132 n.6 (1979)
(emphasis added) (citations omitted).
159 See Decker v. SEC, 631 F.2d 1380 (10th Cir. 1980).
160 See Investment Company Act of 1940, § 17(e)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-17 (1988).
This statute prohibits self-dealing transactions by managers of investment companies.
It is in essence a codification of the old common law rule prohibiting self-interested
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was not an element of the charge, which is similar to a common law
claim for breach of fiduciary duty. In exonerating Decker, the ALJ
applied the clear and convincing standard. The Commission
overruled the ALJ without discussing the applicable standard, then
found that Decker had "willfully aided and abetted a violation of
§17(e)(1)." 161 The Commission imposed the sanction of censure,
and Decker then appealed the Commission's order.
On appeal to the Tenth Circuit, the Commission, though it
could have sought to distinguish Decker's case from Collins on the
ground that fraud was not part of the charges, mounted a facial
challenge: "Although [it is] of the view that it makes no difference
in this case, the Commission urges on appeal that this standard [of
clear and convincing evidence] is inappropriate in civil actions
under the securities laws." 162 The court of appeals held that in
"[Decker's] case involving aiding and abetting a violation of
§17(e)(1) ...

the proper standard ...

is preponderance of the

evidence."1 63 In so doing, however, the court took notice of a
D.C. Circuit decision emphasizing that Collins only applies to cases
of fraud 164 and decided in favor of the SEC on the narrow ground
that the charges did not amount to fraud. The court implicitly
rejected the SEC's challenge to Collins.
It appears that the SEC nonacquiescence strategy was adapted
to deal with the problem of the broad venue provisions under the
securities laws. Decker was censured pursuant to the Investment
Company Act of 1940. Section 43 of the act calls for judicial
"review of such order[s] in the United States Court of Appeals
within any circuit wherein such person resides or has his principal
place of business, or in the United States Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia." 165 These broad provisions effectively
prevent the SEC from knowing with certainty where an appeal will
be filed at the time it issues its enforcement order. The court stated
that the Commission overruled the ALJ without discussing the
applicable standard, and waited until the appeal was filed to argue
for the reversal of Collins.166 While it is impossible to prove
whether such delay was intentional, it is clearly significant that by
transactions by corporate directors.
161 Decker, 631
162 Id.

F.2d at 1383.

Id. at 1384.
16 See Investors Research Corp. v. SEC, 628 F.2d 168, 175 n.41 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
165 Investment Company Act of 1940, §43, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-42 (1988).
166 See Decker, 631 F.2d at 1383.
163
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waiting until the appeal was filed before it explicitly challenged the
validity of Collins, the SEC insured that it would not be brought
before a D.C. Circuit panel to defend its "respectful disagreement"
with the established precedent of that circuit. Thus the SEC
avoided having its attempt at intercircuitnonacquiescence converted
by the petitioners choice of forum into intracircuitnonacquiescence.
Also, had the SEC opinion explicitly challenged the Collins rule, it
is quite possible that Decker's counsel would have seen this as an
opportunity for his client to defeat the SEC by seeking D.C. Circuit
review.

C. Informal SEC Nonacquiescence
Standing alone, the SEC challenge to the Collins standard in
Decker raises doubts as to the SEC's acceptance and compliance with
the standard. The case of Whitney v. SEC167 indicates that the
SEC was not applying the Collins standard even in enforcement
proceedings where it claimed to be doing so.
Whitney was a broker-dealer and insurance salesman who was
disciplined by the SEC for alleged violations of the anti-fraud
provisions of the Securities and Exchange Act, section 10-b and SEC
Rule 10b-5. 168 The underlying transaction involved, the placement, due to the efforts of Whitney, of half of the Town of
Stratford's municipal pension funds in the management of Connect169
icut General Life Insurance Company (CG).
Whitney sought a commission for his efforts from either the
pension funds or CG, but was rebuffed. 170 Whitney claimed to
have reached a private agreement with John Elliott, an executive of
CG, that CG would attempt to compensate him for his efforts by
giving him the brokerage commission for liquidating the securities
167 604 F.2d 676 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
168 Securities Exchange Act of 1934, §10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b).

This section

provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly...
(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any
security registered on a national securities exchange or any security not so
registered, any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in
contravention of such rules and regulations as the Commission may
prescribe ....
Id.

169 See Whitney, 604 F.2d at 677.
170 See id. at 677-78.
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of the pension fund. Elliott died shortly thereafter7 1 and his
1
successor refused to compensate Whitney as described.
Thereafter, Whitney, at the request of the Town, picked up the
securities "for conveyance to CG" and, accompanied by the Town's
pension board chairman, took them to the New York offices of
Thomson, McKinnon, Auschincloss, Kohlmeyer, Inc. (TM).1 7 2 An
account was opened in the name of the pension fund "for the
courtesy of CNA," 17' a broker-dealer company owned by Whitney.
Whitney told the TM employee that he need not send a confirmation to the pension board or CG. n 4
At this point, the SEC claimed, Whitney continued unsuccessfully to try to persuade the Town to use his services for the liquidation.175 When the Town sought to close its account at TM,
however, it was informed that if it did so it would be charged $5,000
for services already performed in opening the account.17 6 The
Town then had TM liquidate the account and TM paid Whitney
1 77
$3,500 out of the brokerage commissions earned from the sale.
The SEC concluded that through this conduct Whitney violated
section 10-b of the Act and Rule 10b-5 by "'deliberately deceiv[ing]'
CG and the Town pension board [in order] 'to obtain compensation
by arranging to have those securities sold through an agent of his
own choosing.'" 178 The Commission, pursuant to section 15(b)
of the Exchange Act, sanctioned Whitney by revoking his brokerdealer registration for nine months. 179 The D.C. Circuit disagreed, reversing and remanding the case. The court held that
"[t]he evidence.., is so contradictory and ambiguous that we think
180
no reasonable person would find it clear and convincing."
Just as it did in the several opinions listed previously, the
Commission stated in Whitney that "[w]hether or not such a
standard is required is of no consequence here. We find the
evidence of Whitney's fraudulent conduct clear and convinc171 See id.
172

Id. at 678. Thomson, McKinnon, Auchincloss, Kohlmeyer, Inc. was a NYSE

member firm and a broker-dealer.

173 Id.
174 See id.
175 See id.
176 See id.
177 See id. at 678-79.
178 Id. at 680 (quoting In re Whitney, Exchange Act Release No. 14,468, 46 S.E.C.

1159, 1164-65 (1978)).
179 See id. at 681.
"'o Id. at 684.
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ing."181 The court, however, rejected the SEC's contention that
it had faithfully applied the correct standard, especially in light of
the SEC position on appeal: "[T]he Commission recited in a footnote
that it found the evidence of... fraud 'clear and convincing.'...
It recalled [the holding of] Collins.... Evidently, however, the
Commission is of the view that Collins is either wrong or inapposite.
We disagree. Collins which we reaffirm today, plainly governs this
18 2
case."
The court ridiculed the Commission's attempts to distinguish
Whitney's case from Collins on the basis that Whitney was merely
suspended and the evidence direct:
These supposed distinctions do not matter. Even were we for
some reason inclined to choose the standard of proof under
section 15(b) on a case-by-case basis, a practice which would not
have occurred to us, we would not
depart from the "clear and
18 3
convincing" standard in this case.
The importance of Whitney is the doubt it casts over the
sincerity of the Commission in the cases just reviewed, where it
claims to have applied the clear and convincing standard of proof
mandated by the court. On its face, the Commission opinion in
Whitney is exactly like those issued in all the other cases recited
above. Yet, on appeal, the Commission challenged the applicability
of the very standard it claimed to have applied. The D.C. Circuit
apparently believed that the Commission had given mere lip service
to the required standard of proof.
The SEC continued to challenge Collins outside of the D.C.
Circuit. In the Fifth Circuit, the Commission finally secured a
18 4
decision which directly. conflicted with Collins, Steadman v. SEC.
In that case, the SEC applied the preponderance of the evidence
standard during an enforcement hearing and found the defendant
guilty of various securities fraud counts.1 8 5 The Commission then
barred Steadman from the securities industry.18 6 Thus, both
elements of the Collins decision were present-charges of fraud and
a severe sanction. Steadman appealed the Commission decision,
claiming that the Commission should have applied the higher
181 In re Whitney, 46 S.E.C. at 1164 n.5.
182 Whitney, 604 F.2d at 680 (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted).
18 Id. at 681.

184 603 F.2d 1126 (5th Cir. 1979), aff'd, 450 U.S. 91 (1981).
'85 See id. at 1137.
186 See id. at 1128.

1992]

SEC NONACQUIESCENCE

1143

standard of proof under Collins.1 8 7 The Fifth Circuit did not
agree: "We are reluctant to say, however, that in all disciplinary
proceedings under the securities anti-fraud provisions the Commission must prove its case by clear and convincing evidence.... [W]e
cannot say here ... that 'the possible injury to the individual is
18 8
significantly greater than any possible harm to the state.'
The Supreme Court granted certiorari and affirmed the SEC
position, primarily through reliance on the Administrative Procedure Act, which it concluded, "was intended to establish a standard
of proof and that the standard adopted is the traditional preponderance-of-the-evidence standard." 18 9 In this case, informal SEC
nonacquiescence was apparently pursued while both intercircuit
dialogue and Supreme Court review were obtained.
Thus, the SEC resisted Collins through both formal intercircuit
nonacquiescence and informal nonacquiescence that was both interand intracircuit. The formal intercircuit nonacquiescence is
exemplified by the Steadman case, where the SEC facially challenged
the Collins standard in the Fifth Circuit. At the same time, the SEC
may well have been informally nonacquiescing, by reciting its
deference to Collins instead of actually applying it. In Whitney, the
Commission's claims of applying the clear and convincing standard,
in addition to its attempts to distinguish the case from Collins,
190
constituted informal intracircuit nonacquiescence.
While neither Estreicher and Revesz nor Diller and Morawetz
would have any objection to the formal intercircuit nonacquiescence
practiced by the SEC in resisting Collins,19 1 both commentators
probably would object seriously to the SEC's informal intracircuit
nonacquiescence. Estreicher and Revesz disapprove of informal
nonacquiescence because, by concealing its behavior from the
courts, the agency does not allow courts to contribute to intercircuit
dialogue, which is the primary benefit of intracircuit nonacquiescence. Informal nonacquiescence is also inconsistent with reasonable efforts to obtain Supreme Court review of the issue, according
See id. at 1137.
Id. at 1139 (quoting Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 427 (1979)).
189 Steadman v. SEC, 450 U.S. 91, 102 (1981).
190 See Whitney v. SEC, 604 F.2d 676 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
191 See Diller & Morawetz, supra note 2, at 802 n.8 (describing intercircuit
nonacquiescence as "not... very controversial"); Estreicher & Revesz, Nonacquiescence, supra note 2, at 735-36 ("[I]ntercrcuit nonacquiescence should not be
constrained.").
187
188
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to Estreicher and Revesz.

192

Diller and Morawetz would object to the SEC's informal
nonacquiescence because it deprives the defendants in SEC
enforcement actions, who are sometimes individuals, of the benefits
of court standards if they lack the resources to appeal an adverse
Commission ruling. 193 Also, Diller and Morawetz would likely
view efforts by the SEC covertly to circumvent the law as a great
threat to court control over the formation and declaration of the
19 4
law.
CONCLUSION

The three cases of clashes between the SEC and the circuit
courts of appeals illustrate how approaches advocated to deal with
nonacquiescence in the context of the Social Security Administration are of limited relevance and applicability to other agencies.
The three part test developed by Estreicher and Revesz states that
an agency can only legitimately engage in intracircuit nonacquiescence when the dispute involves the agency's organic statute.
Grayson shows how this requirement could sharply limit SEC ability
to nonacquiesce in court interpretations of statutes that have a
profound impact on the SEC's ability to regulate the securities
industry effectively. The case also illustrates how small a role the
concerns for individual rights and due process, as voiced by Diller
and Morawetz, should play in judging nonacquiescence when the
litigants opposing an agency are large, well-counseled corporations.
Heublein shows how effectively an agency can nonacquiesce
through means beyond the reach of the courts and probably
Congress. Many agency nonacquiescence practices are simply
beyond legal regulation through any traditional doctrine and are left
to the discretion of the agency. Finally, Collins shows how nonacquiescence is frequently difficult to detect, let alone effectively
regulate, while also casting doubt upon the assertion that informal
nonacquiescence retards the process by which the judiciary clarifies
legal rules.
Another point to be drawn from this Comment is that at least
some agency nonacquiescence is quite beneficial in terms of
192 See Estreicher & Revesz, Nonacquiescence,supra note 2, at 755.
193 See Diller & Morawetz, supra note 2, at 815.
194 See id. at 803-04 ("Continuity between legal standards as expressed in judicial
decisions and legal standards as observed outside the courts is a central aspect of the
rule of law.").
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reaching correct results. In all three of the discussed cases, the SEC
position was at least partially, if not totally, affirmed by the Supreme
Court. The possibility of such results seems to have been ignored
by most commentators, except Estreicher and Revesz. Before any
general policies are implemented in the area of agency intracircuit
nonacquiescence, much greater attention will have to be paid to the
impact such policies will have upon agencies such as the SEC, which
thus far have been neglected in the discussions of the subject.
The generalized approaches forwarded in recent articles by
Estreicher and Revesz and by Diller and Morawetz do not reach
their intended results when they are applied outside of the settings
for which they were designed: repeated, formal, and open nonacquiesence by the SSA, NLRB, and IRS. More importantly,
perhaps these scholars have focused on the wrong problem; if the
SEC is indicative of other agencies, subtle, informal, and hidden
nonacquiescence is more pervasive, and harder to identify.

